Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
Nietzsche and Objectivism

Unit Four: Apr. 17 - May 14

Eyal Mozes' Review Essay
on the Relationship Between the Philosophies of
of Friedrich Nietzsche and Ayn Rand

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Thursday, April 27, 2000 2:16 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: E Mozes Pt. 4 review essay

[From: Eyal Mozes]

Cyberseminar: Pt. 4 review essay


Stephen Hicks suggests three questions regarding the relationship of the
philosophies of Rand and Nietzsche:

1. To what extent do Rand and Nietzsche agree, and how fundamental are these
agreements?

2. To what extent was Rand (specifically, the mature Rand) influenced by
Nietzsche?

3. Did Rand go through a "Nietzschean phase" in her early intellectual
development, during which her philosophy had more significant Nietzschean
elements than the mature Rand?

On question 1, I think Stephen has done such a thorough job in his
introductory essay (with one reservation I voiced in my post last week,
regarding two of the alleged sense-of-life agreements), that I don't see
anything significant to add on this question. The list of positive
agreements between Rand and Nietzsche consists of:
A. philosophy as systematic;
B. consciousness as functional/useful;
C. morality as in the service of life;
and D. an exalted sense of human potential.
(In my commentary on Jason Ticknor-Schwob's part 1 review essay, I argued
against several other perceived similarities between Rand's and Nietzsche's
approaches to morality, such as an alleged similarity between Nietzsche's
concept of Ressentiment and Rand's concept of "hatred of the good for being
the good".)

On question 2, I think the answer follows straightforwardly from the answer
to question 1. It seems extremely unlikely that, if there were any
significant influence by Nietzsche on Rand, she would have agreed with him
on so few issues, while disagreeing on all the fundamental philosophical
questions. It seems far more likely that whatever favorable impression Rand
had of Nietzsche's writings, it came from his expressing ideas (of the four
listed above, especially C and D) that she already believed. (This is also
confirmed by Alan Gotthelf's statement - "On Ayn Rand", p. 14; based on
Rand's 1960-61 biographical interviews - that Rand was initially introduced
to Nietzsche's writings by a cousin who remarked that "he beat you to all of
your ideas".)

In the rest of this essay, therefore, I will focus on question 3; did Rand
have an early "Nietzschean phase"?


Evidence for the "Nietzschean phase"?

As far as I could find, the only defense of the claim that Rand has had a
"Nietzschean phase", with any attempt at presenting evidence for it, has
been by Ron Merrill, in "The Ideas of Ayn Rand", ch. 3. (Chris Sciabarra
also discusses this claim in "Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical", ch. 4; but the
only evidence he cites for the claim is cited from Merrill's book, and he
concludes that the evidence for a "Nietzschean phase" is inconclusive.)

What evidence, then, does Merrill present for his claim? Merrill's entire
evidence - and the only evidence I have ever seen presented for the claim of
a "Nietzschean phase" - consists of two paragraphs, from a conversation
between Kira and Andrei, in the first edition of We The Living, which were
altered in the second edition, and which seem to express contempt for the
masses, and a willingness to see them sacrificed and destroyed for the sake
of the deserving few.

As is to be expected from any attempt to reach far-reaching conclusions
about a thinker's views and intellectual development, on the basis of just
two paragraphs, Merrill's argument is extremely weak. There are two main
weaknesses in Merrill's case:

a. As Stephen Hicks pointed out, in his review of Merrill's book (IOS
Journal, vol. 2 no. 2, Fall 1992), these two paragraphs are highly
inconclusive on just what moral philosophy they express. In the full context
of the dialog in the book, these statements can more plausibly be seen as
the result of not yet having a full account of the proper alternative to
altruism, and therefore letting the Communists, through the character of
Andrei, set the terms of the debate, with sacrificing the masses vs.
sacrificing Kira and Leo as the only two alternatives.

b. Even if we were to take the highly implausible approach, of treating
these two paragraphs as expressing Rand's moral philosophy at the time, and
conclude that the early Rand did indeed believe that the few best people
should be willing to sacrifice the many for themselves; this still does not
support the claim about a Nietzschean phase. It does not change the fact
that We the Living is written with a passion for the individual's happiness
as the ultimate goal; and this just can't be reconciled with any tendency to
Nietzscheanism. Kira's goal is, very clearly, the highly anti-Nietzschean
goal of finding happiness for herself and Leo; and what makes the best
people the best, in the view of the author of We the Living, is their
capacity for happiness. There is nothing in these two paragraphs, in the
rest of the book, or anywhere else in Rand's early writings, to even hint at
a concern for the pursuit of power; for the improvement of the species; for
any of the goals essential to Nietzsche. As much as we torture the evidence
the most it might confess to is that the early Rand did not understand the
harmony of men's interests, and so saw sacrifice of others to oneself as a
legitimate means to pursuing one's happiness; even if this were true, it
would still make her early philosophy different in all essentials from
Nietzsche.


Evidence from Rand's first philosophic journal

In Merrill's version of the "Nietzschean phase" theory, The Fountainhead
represents in symbolic form Rand's struggle to break with Nietzscheanism;
with Wynand representing Nietzscheanism, Roark representing Rand's mature
philosophy, and Dominique, with the choice she faces between the two,
representing Rand herself.

In judging this theory, Rand's May 15, 1934 entry in her philosophical
journal is extremely relevant. Rand writes:

What is accomplished if a man attains power and prominence at the cost of
playing down to the masses? It is not *he* that triumphs, it is not his
ideas and standards. It is only his physical frame. Essentially, he is only
a slave to those masses. (Journals of Ayn Rand, p. 71; previously published
in The Objectivist Forum, vol. 4, no. 4, August 1983).

As Stephen pointed out in his review of Merrill, this is strong evidence
against Merrill's thesis; it demonstrates that in 1934 - before the
publication of We the Living - Rand was already thinking of the Wynand-type
character and could understand what was wrong with attempting to live in
this way.

Merrill claims that Rand turne away from Nietzsche because she could
intuitively sense the problems with his philosophy as a guide to life, and
consequently found herself unable to integrate that philosophy in her
fiction. This claim, too, is contradicted by the above statement, which
shows Rand - prior to the publication of We the Living - considering the
problems of the seeker of power, not at some intuitive level but as an
explicit philosophical issue.

Another highly significant entry, for this issue, is the April 9, 1934
entry. Initially, this entry seems quite Nietszchean, with its attack on
religion. Read more closely, however, we see that her main complaints
against religion are:

I want to learn *why* men do not use logical reasoning
to govern their lives and [solve] their problems. Is it
impossible to them or has it been taught to them as
impossible? I believe this last. And the teacher is
the church. ...

Are instincts and emotions necessarily beyond the control of plain thinking?
Or were they trained to be? Why is a complete harmony between mind and
emotions impossible? Isn't it merely a matter of strict mental honesty? And
who stands at the very bottom of denying such honesty? Isn't it the church?

The early Rand's main accusations against religion, then, demonstrate two
profound differences with Nietzsche - the importance of logic and reason for
her, and her recognition that reason and emotion can be in harmony (and a
belief that religion is the main cause both of people's failure to think
logically and of the unnecessary conflict of reason and emotion).


Conclusion

In his review of Merrill's book, Stephen wrote that until all of Rand's
early notes are published, we may not be able to settle the issue of just
how much she had in common with Nietzsche in her early philosophical views.
Unfortunately, the publication of "The Journals of Ayn Rand" provides us
with very few philosophical notes from that early phase, other than what was
already published in 1983; and it is doubtful we will ever see any more
published.

However, I believe Stephen was too cautious in his remark; the few notes we
have already indicate profound differences with Nietzsche, as early as 1934.
Combined with the lack of any real evidence for significant early agreement
with Nietzsche (beyond the four points on which the mature Rand agreed with
him as well), I think this provides enough evidence to confidently reject
the claims about an alleged "early Nietzschean phase".


[Eyal Mozes]


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Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

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